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Disparate Impact Claims Under
the New Title VII
Michael Carvin*
My topic today focuses on -the rebuttal burden that an employer bears in responding to a disparate impact claim under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 Act"). What were the
issues in terms of this disparate impact claim that Congress, apart
from the decisions it already made in 1964, had to grapple with in
1991? The basic outline of the debate wag that the Bush Administration took the position that there was an inherent tension between the notion of prohibiting disparate impact, an employer
engaging in acts with a disproportionate impact, and our desire to
avoid quota hiring in the workforce. The civil rights groups responded by saying that these were the fanciful wanderings of ideological-straight-white-male-republican-millionaires. Well, I guess I
am all of those except the last.
As one who was creating these fantasies about what problems
would occur if Congress had followed the disparate impact position taken by Senator Kennedy and the civil rights -groups, I would
like to examine exactly what this public policy debate entails. I will
analyze how a disparate impact claim would work if the position of
Senator Kennedy and the civil rights groups had prevailed. First,
what is a disparate impact claim? What does it mean to prohibit a
disparate impact? As I stated earlier, in its purest sense-without
some kind of defense for the employer, it is a government mandate for proportional quotas. It is a command by the government
requiring employers to hire all groups in proportion to their
availability in the area. If an employer's hiring practices result in a
disparate impact on a particular group (i.e., a group is not hired
in proportion to its availability) and Congress makes that illegal,
Congress obviously is requiring employers to hire all groups in
proportion. For example, an employment test has a disproportion-
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ate impact if the top one hundred people who pass the test are
hired, thirty of the top one hundred test takers are black, and the
hiring area is the District of Columbia which has a black population of sixty-five percent. Only thirty percent of the people hired
are black; yet the area is sixty-five percent black. Therefore, a pure
disparate impact standard, which requires that an employment
practice cannot have a disparate impact, would require an employer in the District of Columbia to hire sixty-five blacks. In essence,
it would require employers to engage in proportional quota hiring.
I think that everyone agrees that, therefore, we must create
an escape hatch for employers. An employer must be able to offer
a business justification for not hiring the sixty-five black persons.
Thus, the key question became how stringent should this business
justification be? If it is impossible or unbelievably costly for an
employer to justify the disparate impact, the government essentially is mandating quotas. For example, if a test for ditch diggers
requires an employer to predict who the chief executive officer is
going to be in twenty years, which is impossible to do, the employer essentially is required to engage in quota hiring. On the other
hand, as the civil rights groups, pointed out, if the employer's
burden is too weak, the employer perhaps then could select tests
for the purpose of excluding minorities. For example, the employer could create a test that required a prospective ditch digger to
conjugate irregular Latin verbs in order to get a ditch digger's
job. Such a test would be very stupid, and we certainly would
suspect that the employer had a bad purpose. In addition, an
employer might ignore a test that better served his needs and that
had a less disparate impact. We do not want to allow employers to
forego better tests that have a less disparate impact. We want practices that are fair to the aspirations of minority groups.
So how did Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio resolve this dilemma? Basically, the Court in Wards Cove established a two-fold test.
First, does the employer's selection practice significantly serve his
legitimate business purposes? If the practice does, the Court certainly will not require him to do something that harms his legitimate business purposes. In addition, from the applicant's perspective, a minority applicant would have no reason to complain. If
that applicant is less qualified pursuant to a standard that significantly serves a legitimate business purpose, the applicant will not
contribute as much to the employer's workforce as would the
applicant's nonminority competitors. As a result, a minority plain-
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tiff has not been disserved in any way in that context. The Court
also gave minority plaintiffs a second opportunity to prevail. A
minority plaintiff can still win if the plaintiff develops a test that is
just as good in terms of fulfilling the employer's business purposes
but has less of a disparate impact. If the employer actually is acting in an arbitrary, irrational, or even discriminatory way, the
plaintiff will be able to produce a better test by looking to a similar employer or industry. If the plaintiff can produce a better test,
the plaintiff wins.
The Wards Cove opinion led to some of the more unbelievable
rhetoric among the civil rights community that I have ever heard.
The civil rights community claimed that the Wards Cove opinion
"was a resurrection of Jim Crow," and that "it cast plaintiffs into
the darkness; plaintiffs who were just trying to bring a simple
case." After reading the opinion, however, one simply cannot believe the division between the rhetoric used to describe this case
and the reality of what it held.
With that context, we can now examine the alternative offered
by the civil rights groups. The Bush Administration argued that
this alternative would lead to quotas, which civil rights groups
dismissed as "playing the race card" and the grossest sort of racial
politics. They said that this was gross racial politics because there
was simply no way that restoring their understanding of the Griggs
standard could lead an employer to hire on a quota basis. Under
the alternative of the civil rights groups, in order for an employer
to justify nonproportional hiring, the employer had to prove by
objective evidence that his selection practices were required by
business necessity. In other words, an employer is excused from
hiring by quotas only if the selection practice is necessary to his
business. The alternative of the civil rights groups was a little more
specific in defining business necessity. Under their alternative,
business necessity includes employment practices that are essential
to successful job performance. If the employer considers something that is not essential to successful job performamce, he is
guilty of employment discrimination. Without analyzing the vagaries of Title VII law, I think it is pretty obvious that this alternative
would mandate, in the real world, hiring by quota. Put yourself in
the shoes of the employer who is confronted with a claim that he
has not racially balanced his workforce. The employer, in response, must justify his actions, but the employer faces many practical and conceptual problems in trying to meet this burden. First,
to show that an attribute is essential to the successful job perfor-
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mance, the employer must define what successful job performance
is-this step is a lot harder than one might think. For example,
what is a successful lawyer? Is it somebody who makes a lot of
money? If so, then Thurgood Marshall would not have been a successful lawyer. Thus, just determining what attributes an employer
is looking for in his employees is a tough enough problem, but
the real problem is requiring that employers only test for essential
attributes.
The alternative proposed by the civil rights groups would say
that employers can look only at the essential attributes. First, virtually nothing is essential to job performance, anybody who goes to
law school knows that a law degree is not essential to good performance as a lawyer. Neither Abraham Lincoln nor Clarence Darrow
had a law degree. More important, when you apply for a job, no
employer says, "Do you have the essential qualifications for this
job?;" "Do you have the minimum qualifications?;" or "I am for
hiring for Cravath, Swaine & Moore, oh, you have a Brooklyn law
degree? Fine, here is your office." Employers do not ask questions
about essential qualifications; instead, they engage in a comparison,
of relative qualifications. There are 8 million people with the essential qualifications to be a lawyer, let alone a civil service employee
or a fire fighter, the essential requirement for which is being
vertical. But that is not how people make decisions because it
means that an employer can consider only the minimum qualifications for the job. Employers can exclude only those applicants
who do not have the minimal qualifications. After excluding that
group-those that can not be vertical, the employer must hire on
the basis of race because he is precluded from engaging in a
relative determination of the merits of the individual applicants.
The civil rights community was outraged when people suggested
that this standard might lead to quota hiring.
As I stated earlier, civil rights groups were outraged when
others suggested that their "essential to job performance" alternative might lead to race conscious hiring in the employment arena.
The opposing sides of the debate over the 1991 Act embarked on
a Byzantine discussion of how one actually would articulate a standard for determining the employer's justification, keeping in mind
the competing considerations discussed earlier. Mr. Schnapper said
that it is impossible to articulate such a standard. I disagree. Articulating a standard was not impossible because of language limitations, but because both sides were proceeding from opposite premises. However, Congress finally did pass a bill.
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Of course, the big question is, who won this debate? How was
this debate ultimately resolved in terms of identifying the
employer's justification? A preliminary point is, that another aspect
of Wards Cove put only the burden of production on the employer. In other words, an employer only had to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for his disparate practices. In the 1991 Act,
Congress clearly and unequivocally said that the employer now has
the burden of production and persuasion. In other words, it is his
alternate burden to prove to the court that his business justification is proper. The significance of that burden should be determined on what standard the employer has to show. This standard
was the object of a great debate between the Bush Administration
and the Kennedy forces.
The opposing sides turned to the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA"), even though this Act has nothing to do with racial
discrimination for the answer. Congress clipped the following
phrase from the ADA, "if the employer shows that the challenged
practice is job related to the position in question, and consistent
with business necessity, then the practice is justified," and inserted
it into the 1991 Act. In my view, notwithstanding the reports that
came out in the wake of this compromise, this was a significant
victory for the Bush Administration. This standard preserves the
essential aspects of Wards Cove in terms of a substantive standard-the language Congress chose to define the employer's burdens-and in terms of the purposes clause-the manner in which
Congress treated Wards Cove. As I stated earlier, Congress often
fudges an act's language and its purposes when it cannot develop
a clear standard that will not alienate anyone, and then lets the
courts resolve controversial issues.
Here again, Congress punted. The problem was-to mix my
sports metaphors-the ball was in Kennedy's court. Ambiguity
'would not work this time because the Wards Cove decision was out
there, and it was the law of the United States. Thus, if Congress
were ambiguous about what the law was, and did not use words
like overrule, the Wards Cove opinion would still be good law, and
the Bush Administration would win this debate. Thus, by first
examining the language of the 1991 Act and then analyzing the
Act's legislative history and purposes, I think that Wards Cove is
still the law today on the issue of what constitutes a sufficient
justification.
Again, the language of the statute is "job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." This lan-
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guage is a conjunctive; the employer has two obligations to meet.
To justify a challenged practice despite its disparate iipact, the
defendant must show both that it is "job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity." Despite the
conjunctive between the two clauses, however, it is difficult to
imagine what the second requirement adds to the first.
First, and most important, the second prong mandates only
that a practice be "consistent with" business necessity. In contrast,
the 1990 version of the bill, vetoed by President Bush, ordered
that the employer "demonstrate that such practice is required by
business necessity. The 1990 version of the Act thus would have,
indeed, imposed a most onerous requirement on employers: that
they demonstrate that selection practices are essential to their
business needs. The enacted version, however substantially liberalized this requirement. It mandates only that selection practices be
compatible with business necessity-however that term is defined.
The challenged procedure need not be an essential method, or
the best means, of accomplishing identified needs. The practice
simply has to be connected with, associated with, or related to
business necessity, which is not a particularly demanding standard.
In any event, whatever the proper meaning and scope of the
phrases "consistent with" and "business necessity," both terms
should be essentially irrelevant to future Title VII litigation. This is
because selection practices must in all cases be 'job related for the
position in question." If a practice is job related, it is, by definition, consistent with business necessity. I cannot conceive of a practice that is job related but is nonetheless inconsistent with an
employer's business purposes-even necessary business purposes. A
device that seriously measures a skill or attribute that is job related
simply cannot be inconsistent with the employer's necessity of
hiring on the basis of merit. Accordingly, while the general rule is
that statutes should not be construed so as to render any part superfluous, it clearly seems that the only operative provision of the
new Act is the requirement that practices be "job related for the
position in question." Thus, as Mr. Schnapper even suggested, the
second half of the standard is not really the substantive element
that will get a lot of attention in case law.
The standard that will get the attention is 'Job related for the
position in question." Taking the "fuddy duddy" approach to statutory interpretation, the question is what does this language mean
if we tried to figure it out by going to a dictionary. It is certainly
a standard that is no more onerous, I submit, than Wards Cova
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The standard, however, does require you to consider the hiring
criteria in light of the particular job in question. For instance, an
employer cannot look at a job an applicant might have twenty
years in the future, i.e., testing for a vice-president when the person is applying for a sales position. But as to that particular position, however, the statute simply requires the employer to measure
something related to the job. Again, "related to" is an extraordinarily expansive term which gives the employer a lot of discretion.
The language only requires that it is connected with the job or
associated with the job. In terms of the things that were animating
this debate, it seems to me that, unlike the standard in the 1990
version of the bill and the standard rejected by the Wards Cove
Court, the statute does not say that what the employer tests for
has to be essential or important to the job; it does not have to be
the most important thing for the job. Specifically, under a plain
language analysis, a selection device need not be the best measure
of a job to be "connected" or "related" to the job. Nor need it
measure any skill that is essential or even particularly important to
the job. Skills that are relatively unimportant for a particular job
are nonetheless related to that job. Equally important, a selection
device need not be related to job pefonnance as such. There are
many characteristics of employees-their relationships with fellow
employees and supervisors, drug use, or how well one trains another-that are related to a job, even if they are not directly relevant to job performance. It may be one of those things that, in
the aggregate, makes somebody a little better qualified than another, but by itself is not the important part of the job.
An employer, under a plain-meaning analysis of "related" or
"connected," can consider these types of factors because they are
related to the job even though they are not the central part of
the job. That was the real focus of the debate between the Kennedy and Bush Administration forces. The Kennedy forces only
wanted to consider knowledge, skills, and abilities that were essential to the job. This had really been the course of Title VII law in
the EEOC and with some lower courts during the 197 0s and
1980s. Under that interpretation, employers had a very difficult
burden.
The plain-meaning also does not require the employer to
focus only on characteristics that relate to job performance. Again,
this was the centerpiece of the debate. The Kennedy forces argued
that an employer cannot look at legitimate purposes, but he can
only look at job performance. Therefore, job performance was the
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essential constraint that the Kennedy forces wanted to place on
the employer's hiring and promotion decisions.
However, many factors relate to the job, but do not impact
job performance directly. For example, if partners in a law firm
were deciding to whom they would offer a partnership position,
they would not make an offer to an admiralty lawyer, even if she
were the best admiralty lawyer in the world, if the firm did not
have any need for an admiralty lawyer. On the other hand, the
firm could have an associate who could not find his way out of his
office, but his best friend is general counsel at Westinghouse and
sends the firm $ 5 million a year in legal fees. Even though that
associate cannot perform his job, the firm has a strong, legitimate
business purpose in maximizing firm profits, for making him a
partner. Obviously, one considers these factors because they are
related to the job. The Bush Administration and Kennedy forces
debated a whole list of these types of issues, and it seems to me
that the words "related to the job" could clearly encompass them.
For example, an employer could consider an employee's relationship with his supervisor; the employee's absentee rate; whether or
not the employee engages in drug use, even if it is not affecting
that individual's job performance. Thus, it seems that this notion
of job relatedness does encompass the broader question of whether one can consider the employer's legitimate business purposes.
Job relatedness, in the 1991 Act, does not encompass validation
studies or the other tests developed by the administrative agencies,
particularly the EEOC, which demonstrate that showing "job relatedness" is virtually impossible because these statistical studies are
incredibly difficult to develop. None of that is incorporated, codified, or referenced in the 1991 Act or in the legislative history.
I have just set forth an analysis of what the words in the 1991
Act mean. A valid response, however, is that the term "job related"
might well be a term of art that had some meaning in the Title
VII world or that the Supreme Court had discussed, and Congress
had that meaning in mind when it used this term. Thus, the term
"job related" carries all the meanings incorporated in prior Supreme Court opinions that discussed the meaning of job relatedness. Indeed, Congress specifically addresses these prior Supreme
Court opinions in the purposes clause of the statute and defines
the term "job related" based on those Supreme Court opinions. In
the statute, Congress says that the terms "job related" and "business necessity" are intended to codify the meaning given to those
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terms in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove
Unfortunately, this definition simply avoids the question of
what these terms mean. Congress just punted. The whole debate
between the supporters and opponents of the 1991 Act was exactly
what the Supreme Court meant by the phrase "job related" prior
to the Wards Cove decision and whether Wards Cove faithfully reflected that understanding. The 1991 Act's supporters argued that
the Supreme Court's prior Title VII precedent, primarily relying
on Grigp, held that selection devices be "required by business
necessity," or some similar formulation, and that Wards Cove constituted a dramatic relaxation of that standard. Opponents of the
Act, in contrast, argued that Title VII case law, in particular New
York Transit Authority v. Beazer, Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
and Washington v. Davis, simply required that a selection device
bear a demonstrable relationship to job performance or some
business purpose and that Wards Cove merely adopted and applied
this well established principle. As noted, the purposes clause did
not purport to resolve this debate. In addition, the 1991 Act, by
its terms, prevents either side from putting its gloss on the meaning of Title VII case law through legislative history.
How did they resolve this question of the meaning of these
two entirely different views of what job relatedness meant in the
opinions prior to Wards Cove? Well, in the purposes section, Congress essentially said that what job related meant in the prior
opinions is what job related meant in the prior opinions. Congress
refers one back to these opinions, but does not resolve the debate. This reminds me of the arguments that I used to have with
my mother. "It means what I said it means, and do not ask me
any further questions." Thus, Congress simply did not resolve the
question that had animated this two-year debate. In short, the
opposing sides of the 1991 Act debate simply agreed to disagree
about what substantive standard guided pre-Wards Cove case law
and the extent to which Wards Cove was faithful to that standard.
I certainly recognize that this language, codifying all the opinions prior to Wards Cove, indicates some disfavor with Wards Cove. I
mean, Wards Cove is lonely; everybody else has been codified. That
one opinion is sitting out there uncodified. However, I just do not
think that vague distaste for an opinion overrules it. Furthermore,
the opinion in Wards Cove itself meant to adopt the reasoning in
the prior opinions as to the meaning of job relatedness. The
Court did not say that it was departing from all these stupid opin-
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ions, but instead said that it was codifying them. The Court did
not say it was interrupting them, but that its holding was well
established. Thus, in the next case, when the Court is next asked
to determine the meaning of job relatedness in the opinions prior
to Wards Cove, the Supreme Court presumably will say what it said
it was in Wards Cove. "Nobody told us to change the law, we were
not lying in Wards Cove. We were telling the truth, and we will tell
you the truth again. It'means what we said it meant.'Therefore, in
my view, the statute's failure to resolve this debate necessarily
means that Wards Cove's understanding of "job related" and "business necessity" must still be the governing law of the land. In that
decision, a majority of the Supreme Court set forth its good faith
understanding of the substantive requirements of Title VII concerning job relatedness. There is no hint in the opinion that its
understanding of this concept marked a departure from prior case
law or that Wards Cove otherwise overruled previous decisions. To
the contrary, the opinion quoted extensively from prior Supreme
Court Title VII decisions and purported to simply apply the understanding of the job relatedness and business necessity established
in those cases.
Since Wards Cove was simply an interpretation and application
of Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove, rather than a departure from those cases, the Act's codification of the concepts
embodied in those pre-Wards Cove cases provides no basis for the
Supreme Court to depart from Wards Cove. Rather, a majority of
the Supreme Court in future cases should, and presumably will,
do precisely what a majority of the court did in Wards
Cove-interpret pre-existing Title VII case law in the same manner
as it interpreted that law in the Wards Cove opinion.
Certainly nothing in the 1991 Civil Rights Act requires or
indicates that the Court should do otherwise. In order to amend
the requirements of a statute "erroneously" interpreted by a Supreme Court decision, Congress must either set forth its own substantive standard in language which, normally understood, departs
from the standard created by the Court's opinion, or at a minimum, must explicitly state that it is overruling the disfavored opinion. While the vetoed 1990 version of the Civil Rights Act plainly
did both these things, the 1991 version enacted into law plainly
did neither.
In the 1990 version of the Act, the one former President
Bush vetoed, Congress actually used the word, overruled. Congress
said the purpose of this Act is to incorporate job relatedness as
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used in Griggs, and to overrule the meaning given to it in Wards
Cove- That provision was unacceptable to the Bush Administration,
and so the bill ultimately enacted includes the provision, quoted
above, stating that one purpose of the Act is to codify the concept
of business necessity enunciated by the Supreme Court in Giggs
and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove.
Thus, the version of the Act ultimately enacted deletes the provision expressly overruling Wards Cove and substitutes a statement
which simply incorporates pre-Wards Cove case law. Accordingly,
interpreting the 1991 Act to overrule Wards Cove would render this
revision meaningless. This would run afoul of the statutory construction principle that changes in language between proposed
and enacted bills should be deemed to have meaning.
To be sure, disparate impact case law prior to Wards Cove was
not entirely consistent, and both supporters and opponents of the
1990 bill could point to phrases from Supreme Court decisions
supporting their understanding of the job-related requirement.
The relevant point, however, is that the Supreme Court decision
in Wards Cove interpreted the Court's prior opinions in a manner
displeasing to the 1990 Act's supporters. It was therefore incumbent upon them to reverse that decision. The Act, however, neither states that Wards Cove is overturned nor creates new substantive language which, naturally understood, differs from the analysis
contained in Wards Cove. Rather, the Act uses substantive language
which, on its face, is certainly no more onerous on employers
than the standard adopted in Wards Cove and states that this language should be interpreted consistent with the very Supreme
Court decisions analyzed in Wards Cov&
If we assume that Congress did overturn Wards Cove and look
at the broader purposes and spirits animating the statute, the
Court is still presented with an insolvable dilemma. We know that
Congress did not like the Wards Cove view of job related, but what
should the Court use in future cases? Mr. Schnapper said it is
impossible to come up with a standard. Even if the Court could
come up with one, what exactly are they supposed to use? In
future cases, the Court should not and presumably will not suggest
that its interpretation of these decisions in Wards Cove was disingenuous or intellectually dishonest. And even were the Court inclined to do so, the Act and its legislative history provide no guidance on what understanding of the pre-Wards Cove case law should
be adopted in its stead. They cannot look at the prior opinions
because they have already looked at those. Presumably, they can-
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not look at the bill Kennedy introduced, or the 1990 Act because,
of course, they would be enacting a bill that was vetoed and thus
would change the one that was actually enacted. The Court should
not be in the business of creating statutes which cannot be enacted through the democratic law-making process. The Court cannot retreat to the version of the 1990 Act. Even if we assume that
this congressional frown is somehow determinative of Congress'
attitude to Wards Cove, Congress nonetheless has failed to provide
the Court with an alternative standard or to tell them how to use
the case law to determine the meaning of job relatedness.
This brings us back to where we started this discussion. The
question in interpreting the 1991 Act-determining its effect on
Wards Cove--will depend largely on whether or not courts will
interpret laws to mean what the law says or whether they will write
laws for Congress that Congress did not have the wit or the will to
write for itself. The reader here probably can guess where I stand
on the issue. I think that Congress failed in its constitutional duty.
It did not say what it meant, and it did not resolve for us the
fundamental public policy questions of the day. The Supreme
Court exceeds its authority when it writes a law for Congress. The
Court certainly exceeds its authority when it overrules a clear writing of Congress, as it did in Steelworkers v. Weber. The Court also
exceeds its authority if it penalizes private actors for their conduct
by erecting a standard of conduct that Congress was either unwilling or unable to establish. If you cannot find the law in the United States Code or in the legislative history (actually, under this
Act, one is prohibited from looking at the legislative history), it
would be unfair and utterly improper for the Court to erect such
a standard. The Court should insist that if Congress wants to write
a law, it must write that law. This requirement has the constitutional virtue of leaving the law-making power in the legislative
branch. It also has the democratic virtue of giving the citizens
some notion of where its elected representatives actually stand on
the issues, without allowing them to obfuscate and obscure the
issues. If that method of analysis is followed in terms of interpreting the Wards Cove standard and the 1991 Act, Wards Cove will
remain the law.

